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Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.10 (2000): Except as limited by the terms of the servitude determined under § 4.1, the holder of an easement or profit as defined in § 1.2 is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefited by the servitude. Unless authorized by the terms of the servitude, the holder is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment. __________________ b. Application of public policy favoring productive land use. In resolving conflicts among the parties to servitudes, the public policy favoring socially productive use of land generally leads to striking a balance that maximizes the aggregate utility of the servitude beneficiary and the servient estate. Socially productive uses of land include maintaining stable neighborhoods, conserving agricultural lands and open space, and preservation of historic sites, as well as development for residential, commercial, recreational, and industrial uses. Aggregate utility is generally produced by interpreting an easement to strike a balance that maximizes its utility while minimizing the impact on the servient estate. __________________ c. Servitude holder is entitled to make any use reasonably necessary for convenient enjoyment. This section states the general rule that the holder of an easement is authorized to make any use of the servient estate that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the easement. However, unless expressly authorized, the servitude holder is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment (see Comment g). ______________________ g. Unreasonable damage to servient estate. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the holder of an easement is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate. Because the holder of an easement is generally entitled to enter the servient estate to make improvements and construct improvements, a certain amount of damage or inconvenience to the servient estate may be within the contemplation of the parties. However, under the rule stated in this section, the servitude owner is not entitled to cause any greater damage than that contemplated by the parties, or reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the servitude. Unless clearly contemplated by the parties, it is not assumed that the servient owner intends to permit the easement owner to remove existing structures or terminate existing uses of the servient estate. _________________________ Ctr. Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. City of Derby, 166 Conn. 460, 464–65, 352 A.2d 304, 307 (1974) pgs 464-466 123456 The owner of land over which an easement has been granted has, by law, all the rights and benefits of ownership consistent with the existence of the easement. American Brass Co. v. Serra, 104 Conn. 139, 150, 132 A. 565; 28 C.J.S. Easements s 91; 61 Am.Jur.2d, Pipelines, s 36; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 626, s 5. The owner of an easement has all rights incident or necessary to its proper enjoyment, but nothing more. Great Hill Lake, Inc. v. Caswell, 126 Conn. 364, 367, 11 A.2d 396; 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, s 72; Restatement, 5 Property s 486. Of necessity, the interests of the owner of the easement often conflict with the interest of the owner of the burdened estate. By law, however, each of the parties owes certain duties to the other. The owner of a pipeline easement has been required to repair a breach in a fence caused by construction so as to preserve the enclosure around the servient land and to guarantee the full use and enjoyment of the land to the owner thereof. M. & M. Pipe Line Co. v. Menke, 45 S.W.2d 344, 345-346 (Tex.Civ.App.). Where the instrument is silent, the owner of an easement has a duty to make such repairs as are necessary for the owner of the land to have the reasonably use of his estate. 3 Powell, Real Property, 415, p. 514. The owner of an easement may be held liable for damages caused by his negligent use of the easement, and this liability extends to damages to the servient estate. Gager v. Carlson, 146 Conn. 288, 293, 150 A.2d 302; Schwab v. Charles Parker Co., 55 Conn. 370, 372, 11 A. 183; cf. Corvo v. Waterbury, 141 Conn. 719, 725, 109 A.2d 869; Davis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 248 Ark. 881, 454 S.W.2d 331; J. M. Huber Petroleum Co. v. Yake, 121 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Civ.App.) (liability imposed for damages resulting from failure of easement *465 owner to refill a pipeline trench and for failing to repair fences breached during construction); Kincade v. Mikles, 144 F.2d 784 (8th Cir.) (liability imposed for damages resulting from failure of easement owner to repair fences breached during construction); 61 Am.Jur.2d, Pipelines, s 42. The owner of an easement may be held to have a duty to maintain it where failure to do so would injure the servient estate. 2 Thompson, Real Property (1961 Replacement) s 428, pp. 710-11. In some instances, the owner of the servient estate may repair a right-of-way at the expense of the owner of the easement. Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1026. ‘78 The use of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit.’ 2 Thompson, op. cit. s 427, p. 699; Baker v. Pierce, 100 Cal.App.2d 224, 226, 223 P.2d 286; Doan v. Allgood, 310 Ill. 381, 384, 141 N.E. 779. In this case, the language of the instrument is broad in scope. The city was entitled to construct pipelines to convey sewage ‘over, across, through, and under’ the plaintiff's land. Ordinarily when opinions speak of the ‘use’ of an easement, it arises in right-of-way cases. Thus ‘use’ frequently involves the amount of traffic over the easement or alterations to the land to make it passable. Here, part of the use to which the defendant city of Derby subjected the plaintiff's land was the removal of a portion of the flood control dike. Under the provisions of the easement, the defendant city could have subjected the plaintiff's land to certain types of more burdensome uses. For example, **308 the language of the grant would have permitted laying a pipeline on top of the ground, possibly interfering with the access to some of the plaintiff's land. The defendant city, however, *466 elected to sink the pipeline below ground level. This required breaching the dike. It is clear that the action of the defendant city in leaving the dike breached forced the plaintiff to choose between either repairing the dike or allowing the land to remain exposed to a greater risk of harm from flooding. There is no showing in the record that the action of the plaintiff in rebuilding the dike interfered with the defendant city's pipeline or that preserving the breach in the dike was in any way necessary for the defendant city's use of the easement. Indeed, if it had been necessary, the defendant city could have maintained an action against the plaintiff under the easement. Patalano v. Chabot, 139 Conn. 356, 362, 94 A.2d 15. As it was not necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement to have the ditch open at the site of the dike, it was within reason for the court to conclude that the owner of the premises was entitled to have the dike restored and to have the servient estate protected by the dike, as it had been before the actions of the defendants. The finding indicates that the defendant city instructed the defendant contractor not to repair the dike after the sewer was completed. The argument in the city's brief, that the United States Army Corps of Engineers contemplated the construction of another dike, is not supported by any facts in the finding. The inference drawn by the court, that the defendant city of Derby took a calculated risk in instructing its contractor not to repair the dike, thereby receiving a credit on the contract price, is well supported by the facts found. 9 A judgment of $5700 was rendered by the court. AFFIRMED. _____________ But see Hanson v. Estell, 100 Wash. App. 281, 287–289, 997 P.2d 426, 430–431 (Div. 3 2000) (balancing equities, and refusing to order removal of easement holders' barn that encroached upon right-of-way by one foot and did not block landowners' use of easement area); Brown v. Voss, 105 Wash. 2d 366, 372–373, 715 P.2d 514, 517–518 (1986) (holding that servient owner was not entitled to injunction where overburden caused no actual injury and grant of injunction would substantially harm easement holder); Castanza v. Wagner, 43 Wash. App. 770, 777, 719 P.2d 949, 953 (Div. 1 1986) (not requiring removal of underground utility lines when utilities were installed in good faith, and removal would be expensive and provide only slight benefit to servient owner). ___________________ Absent an express provision in a grant or a reservation,1 an easement is not an exclusive interest in the burdened land.2 The servient owner retains all rights in the property, subject only to the easement.3 § 8:20.Use of easement area by servient owner—Rights in general, The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land § 8:20 __________________ Anderson v. Hudak, 80 Wn.App. 398, 907 P.2d 305, (Div. 2 1995) The trial court found that Anderson had not satisfied the elements of adverse possession as to the 15-foot strip west of the trees. But the trial court found that Anderson proved she adversely possessed the trees; the trial court then quieted title in Anderson to an area including the line of trees and extending 5 feet west of the trees. The trial court also granted Anderson a permanent easement over the Hudaks' property in airspace for the branches and for "reasonable rights of access on the land to trim, prune, cultivate and maintain the same." Finally, the easement that was granted in the airspace of the Hudaks' property to preserve and protect the branches of the trees with rights of access has no basis in any fact. Anderson never maintained the trees in the past since their planting, nor is there support in law for the granting of this [907 P.2d 310] legal interest in the Hudak property. The trial court erred.